According to most courts that had considered the question, the FOIA creates no private right of action to enjoin disclosure. 25 In Chrysler, a unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, adopted this majority view, as had the Third Circuit Court of Appeals below. 26 The Supreme Court held that while exempt records (which it assumed the documents in issue to be 27 ) could be withheld, the Act did not require nondisclosure. An exemption "demarcates the agency's obligation to disclose; it does not foreclose disclosure. ' 28 The Act's clear language and legislative history strongly support the Court's conclusion. 29 Moreover, since Congress "did not limit an agency's discretion to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA, [ 27. 441 U.S. at 319 n.49. The court of appeals had not decided whether the trade secrets exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976), applied to these records; it assumed it did apply for purposes of argument. The Supreme Court therefore avoided this issue, leaving open the possibility that, on remand, the court would find the exemption inapplicable and require disclosure.
28. 441 U.S. at 292. But see note 82 infra. Language in an earlier Supreme Court opinion presaged the Chrysler Court's permissive construction of the exemptions. In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) , the Court stated that the FOIA's exemptions "set up concrete, workable standards for determining whether material may be withheld or must be disclosed." Id at 79 (emphasis added). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 290 n.9. 29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976) merely states that subsection 552(a), containing the Act's disclosure requirements, "does not apply" to records subject to one of the nine exemptions. This in no way affects an agency's discretion to disclose. Moreover, as the Chrysler opinion noted, 441 U.S. at 292, the FOIA's jurisdictional provision grants courts authority only to mandate disclosure, not to bar it. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
The legislative history cited by the Court, 441 U.S. at 294 n.16, also contains language indicating the statute is permissive. On several occasions, the House Report plainly refers to exemption from disclosure as permissive rather than mandatory. H.R. REp 32 The Court discovered none. 33 Moreover, it found such an inference to be unnecessary in light of its decision that section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act 34 provided Chrysler with a basis for judicial review of the agency's determination to disclose. 35 Although violation of the Trade Secrets Act could not be enjoined in a private action under that statute, "any such violation may have a dispositive effect on the outcome of judicial review of agency action pursuant to § 10 of the APA." '36 Since the Trade Secrets Act places substantive limits on agency action, Chrysler could seek review under the Administrative Procedure Act as a person "adversely affected or aggrieved" 37 by such action. The Court did not, however, decide what standard of review a court conducting an Administrative Procedure Act review of the agency's decision to disclose should employ. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals had decided that certain agency regulations 38 constituted agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information... which.. . concerns or relates to the trade secrets [or confidential business information] of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association. . . shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment. (1976) , was held to constitute authorization by law to release exempt data. The Martin Marietta opinion recognized that the Federal Trade Commission Act did not permit the agency to disclose trade secrets, as opposed to other confidential business information, but the court found that the documents contained no trade secrets. 475 F. Supp. at 342.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
38. 41 C.F.R. § § 60-40.1 to 40.4 (1979).
Vol. 1980:139]
"authorization by law" to disclose within the meaning of the Trade Secrets Act, 39 and that the Act did not therefore prohibit disclosure.
40
The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals on this issue, although it agreed that "properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations" 41 could serve as the authorization by law to disclose information otherwise subject to the Act's prohibition. After an extensive analysis of the question, the Court found that the particular regulations 42 the agency relied on to support disclosure were neither substantive nor properly promulgated. The regulations were not substantive rules having the force and effect of law because they were not reasonably within congressional delegations of authority under the FOIA, 43 under the "housekeeping statute" for executive agencies, 44 or under any other legislative enactment cited by the agency in question. 45 Furthermore, procedural defects in the adoption of the regulations precluded them from acquiring the force of law. 4 6 The Court therefore vacated the Third Circuit's determination that disclosure was "author-
39.
See note 31 supra. 40. 565 F.2d at 1186, 1188. 41. 441 U.S. at 295. A substantive rule, unlike interpretative rules and general statements of agency policy or procedure, affects individual rights and obligations. To be accorded the force of law, the regulation must be the "product of a congressional grant of legislative authority." Id at 303. It must also be promulgated in accordance with the APA's requirements of notice of the proposed rule and opportunity to comment before promulgation. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
42. See note 38 supra. 43. Records exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA are "outside the ambit of that Act." 441 U.S. at 303. The Act cannot, therefore, serve as the authorization for regulations permitting disclosure. Id at 303-04.
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) (providing in part: "The head of an Executive department... may prescribe regulations for. . . the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public"). Relying upon the statute's legislative history, the Court concluded that the Act was meant only to allow "housekeeping"--agency regulation of internal affairs-and not to authorize release of trade secrets or confidential business information. 441 U.S. at 310-12. The Court thereby disagreed with the opinion of the lower court, siding with the District of Columbia Circuit's decision on this issue in Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 519 tered, several important changes were effected. 58 Three significant changes made by the new executive order should be noted. First, it imposes slightly stricter minimum standards of classification. Whereas the old order permitted authorized officials to classify material as confidential if "its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security, ' 59 Executive Order No. 12,065 stipulates that information is properly classified as confidential if its unauthorized disclosure "reasonably could be expected to cause identjqable damage to the national security. '60 Whether the change in language will have an appreciable effect on officials authorized to classify documents, or on the courts, remains to be seen. The language suggests, however, that the President's intent was to limit the availability of classification by requiring a more concrete demonstration of potential damage to the nation's security.
A second change is that the new order incorporates a provision found in the National Security Council directive implementing the prior order, 6 ' to the effect that any reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of declassification. The new order states: "If there is reasonable doubt which designation is appropriate, or whether the information should be classified at all, the less restrictive designation should be used, or the information should not be classified." ' 62 Third, section 3-303 of Executive Order No. 12,065 states that information should be declassified if "the public interest in disclosure outweighs the damage to national security that might reasonably be expected from disclosure. ' 63 This determination is to be made by an official responsible for processing FOIA requests or an official with Top Secret classification authority. 64 1)." Halperin, supra note 58, at 13. This conclusion is misleading. While the provision is potentially of great significance, it in no way "amends" the FOIA. The first exemption permits agencies to withhold only those materials that meet the substantive and procedural precepts of an executive order. The FOIA does not define or limit the terms of this order, the public interest provision is merely a new term in the executive order, not a change in the FOIA itself. , the court determined that the documents were exempt under subsection (b)(1), after having ordered the defendant to perform the balancing test of section 3-303. Although the court stated that balancing was not required in all cases, it held that it could determine when balancing was necessary as part of its scrutiny of the agency's compliance with the order's procedural guidelines. In ACLU v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979), Judge Cummings, concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted that "the Executive order requires the declassification of documents when, as here, there is a 'public interest in disclosure of the information.'" Id at 285 n.3. The majority did not address the question.
Three cases discussed the FOIA's requirement that segregable portions of withheld documents be disclosed, 5 U.S. v. Rosen, 70 despite its refusal to itemize publicly the documents being withheld pursuant to the national security exemption. Judge Wilkey, writing for the majority, accepted the agency's argument that disclosure of the existence of the records, as well as their content, could be withheld on the theory that in some instances the existence of particular records is more sensitive than their substance. Since the court believed that public acknowledgement of the monitoring could endanger the national security, the FOIA did not require disclosure. 7 1 Under the circumstances, therefore, the public record was adequate.
III. FEDERAL STATUTES EXEMPTION
A. The Consumer Product Safety Act.
73
As amended in 1976, 74 Exemption 3 of the FOIA deals with federal statutes that either require withholding information or, alternatively, specify the criteria for withholding or refer to particular matters to be withheld. 75 Cases interpreting the third exemption thus hinge on the court's construction of a statute other than the FOIA, and a subsequent determination whether the information requested falls within the ambit of that withholding statute. 3, 1979) . The court in Walter held that in an Exemption 7(A) context, where an index of the withheld records would "afford prospective defendants with a complete insight into the case being compiled against them," the index need not be made public. The court characterized its holding as consistent with the national interest and the purposes of the FOIA.
72. The court also held that an in camera inspection of the records was unnecessary, and that an affidavit submitted for in camera consideration, without the presence of opposing counsel, was sufficient under the circumstances to establish that the documents were within the exemption. 608 F.2d at 1388. 75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976), which exempts matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . , provided that such statute (A) requires that thb matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. different conclusions regarding that Act's effect on FOIA disclosure. 79 This significant conffict between the Second and Third Circuits may eventually be resolved by the Supreme Court. 80 In both cases, submitters of information to the Consumer Product Safety Commission sued to prevent disclosure of information in response to an FOIA request. The submitters claimed that disclosure would be inconsistent with section 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act,"' which they interpreted to be an Exemption 3 withholding statute. 82 Section 6(b)(1) provides that the Consumer Product Safety Commission, before publicly disclosing information submitted to it, must both notify the submitter of its decision to disclose and insure that the information is accurate. 83 [The Commission shall, to the extent practicable, notify, and provide a summary of the information to, each manufacturer or private labeler of any consumer product to which such information pertains, if the manner in which such consumer product is to be designated or described in such information will permit the public to ascertain readily the identity of such manufacturer or private labeler, and shall provide such manufacturer or private labeler with a reasonable opportunity to submit comments to the Commission in regard to such information. The Commission shall take reasonable steps to assure, prior to its public disclosure thereof, that information from which the identity of such manufacturer or private labeler may be readily ascertained is accurate, and that such disclosure is fair in the circumstances and reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of this chapter. 84. The Consumer Product Safety Commission did not argue that the material could be released under section 6(b)(l); it acknowledged that it was inaccurate and misleading. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d at 799-800; Vf. Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585 F.2d at 1388 n.28 (encourag-that the section applies only when the Commission disseminates information to the public on its own initiative, rather than when it merely responds to an FOIA request. In Pierce & Stevens, the court adopted the Consumer Product Safety Commission's position, thereby permitting the Commission to disclose; 85 the GTE Sylvania court, on the other hand, rejected that argument, holding that section 6(b)(1) pertains to either type of disclosure, that it is an Exemption 3 withholding statute, and that consequently the agency could not disclose. 86 Judge Feinberg's decision for the Second Circuit in Pierce & Stevens attempted to interpret the Consumer Product Safety Act so as to minimize its conflict with the FOIA. Whereas the FOIA calls for prompt disclosure, 87 the notification procedures of the Consumer Product Safety Act take much longer. 88 Moreover, the Consumer Product Safety Act, by advising an agency to review or rewrite a document to make it more accurate, 89 contrasts with the FOIA, which mandates disclosure only of existing documents, less any exempt portions. Finally, ing the Consumer Product Safety Commission to include with the records the submitter's statement regarding their inaccuracy).
85. 585 F.2d at 1386-89. Of course, if the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 2051-2081 (1976), does not prohibit disclosure, the FOIA presumably mandates release. But see 585 F. Supp. at 1389 ("On this view, we need not resolve the argument between the parties over whether section 6(b)(1) meets the criteria of exemption three").
86. 598 F.2d at 814-16. 87. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) requires that the agency determine whether to release the records within 10 days after reviewing the request, and decide any appeal within 20 days. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) defines certain "unusual circumstances," not relevant here, in which these deadlines may be extended. Courts differ on when circumstances are so unusual as to allow the agency to have additional time pursuant to this subsection or subsection (a)(6)(C). See Spectator Publishing Co. v. CIA, No. 78-1705 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1979). That case held, based on an undisputed agency affidavit, that the CIA was entitled to additional time because it had demonstrated that "exceptional circumstances" exist and the agency is responding to the request with "due diligence." Slip op. at 4 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1976)). The court decided that handling appeals in order of receipt, processing by means of a "first in, first out" system, and handling FOIA and Privacy Act claims together demonstrated the agency's due diligence. The high volume of requests matched against the agency's limited personnel and funding constituted the exceptional circumstances. Id. at 7-8. the agency to notify the requester within 30 days as to the number of pages encompassed by the request, but allowing the agency to decide at a later time whether to disclose, depending on the number of pages of records in issue).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976), which requires "not less than 30 days" notice to the submitter prior to public disclosure.
Id
the Consumer Product Safety Act expressly incorporates the nine exemptions of the FOIA; 90 this led the court to conclude that Congress did not intend to affect FOIA disclosure of nonexempt documents. 91 In a brief discussion of legislative intent, 92 the Pierce & Stevens court focused upon a statement contained in a congressional committee report studying amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act after its enactment. 93 The court concluded, as had the authors of the report, that section 6(b)(1) and the FOIA addressed different questions: the Consumer Product Safety Act provision referred to public disclosure initiated by the Commission; the FOIA contemplated "passive" release in response to a valid request by another party. 94 This construction of the two statutes, the court believed, minimized the conflict between them and effectuated the goals of both. 95 The more extensive opinion in GTE Sylvania disputed the Pierce & Stevens argument point by point, concluding that the provisions of section 6(b)(1) apply to FOIA disclosures as well as to Commission-initiated publication. The court explained that the "public disclosure" referred to in section 6(b)(1) could be understood-based on an analysis of the legislative history and statutory language-only as "encompassing disclosure to members of the public through the FOIA." 96 Any potential conflict between the Consumer Product Safety Act and the FOIA was avoided by the court's finding that section 6(b)(1) qualifies The court conceded that disclosure to the FOIA requester might result in widespread publication, but explained that "in contrast to publicity releases by the Commission, there is no government imprimatur on the document in that situation." 585 F.2d at 1388.
95. 585 F.2d at 1388. 96. 598 F.2d at 803. The court's statutory analysis is somewhat unpersuasive. It noted that the FOIA exemptions were incorporated in the same section as the disclosure provisions--section 6(b)(1)-and relied on this fact to show that the disclosure provisions refer to FOIA disclosure, However, the statute can easily be read, as it was by the Pierce & Stevens court, as referring to the FOIA exemptions only as a limitation upon Commission-initiated dissemination that otherwise satisfies the criteria set forth in section 6(b)(1). Similarly, the GTE Sylvania court is not persuasive in arguing that section 6(b)(2), by enumerating exceptions to section 6(b)(1) but not including the FOIA among them, implicitly places FOIA requests within the ambit of section 6(b)(1). Only if disclosure pursuant to the FOIA is reached by section 6(b)(1) initially would the absence of an exemption be relevant; the section 6(b)(2) exemptions are all matters to which section 6(b)(1) would unquestionably apply but for section 6(b)(2). More convincing is the court's discussion of legislative history, 598 F.2d at 804-12, citing the various debates and reports, and arguing that the subsequent history contained in the committee report considering Consumer Product Safety Act amendments, relied upon in Pierce & Stevens, is entitled to little weight.
as
By the very fact that Exemption 3 incorporates specific nondisclosure statutes into the general scheme of the FOIA, inconsistencies will arise as agencies attempt to comply with those specific statutes while processing FOIA requests. Exemption 3 was designed to provide the agencies with the flexibility needed to accommodate those inconsistencies. 97 The court agreed with the district judge's determination that the statute established particular criteria for withholding as required by Exemption 3. Nondisclosure is permitted under section 6(b)(1) only when the information would identify the manufacturer and the Consumer Product Safety Commission has not taken, or cannot take, "reasonable steps to assure that disclosure would be accurate, fair and related to the Act's purposes. The standards set forth in section 6(b)(1) are sufficiently definite that they provide a reviewing Court with criteria to measure the Commission's compliance with Congress' intent." 98 Holding that section 6(b)(1) is a withholding statute, and that the material was within the statute's nondisclosure provisions, the court permanently enjoined the Commission from releasing the records. 99 The disparate approaches of the GTE Sylvania and Pierce & Stevens courts are perplexing: the courts attack the problem from completely different starting points and fail to agree on a single issue relevant to the litigation. How the Supreme Court, the other courts of appeals, and the Congress respond will significantly affect the future application of the FOIA.
B. Other Federal Statutes.
Although the Consumer Product Safety Act precipitated a significant controversy in 1979, most courts considering the applicability of Exemption 3 during the year discussed other federal laws. One statute construed in many cases 1°° was section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision entitled "Confidentiality and Disclosure of Returns and Return Information."' 0 ' 1 All the courts interpreting that provision agreed that it qualified as an Exemption 3 withholding statute; 1 0 2 the 97. Id at 813. 107. The bill is entitled "A bill to enhance the foreign intelligence and law enforcement activities of the United States by improving the protection of information necessary to their effective operation." H.R. 5129, supra note 87. It would amend 50 U.S.C. § 403g (1976) by broadening the scope of this exempting statute. It would also amend the FOIA by preventing convicted felons or their agents from utilizing the Act to acquire records from intelligence or law enforcement agencies, and by altering various provisions in the FOIA to exempt many records of such agencies from the Act's purview. The bill, which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Government Operations, is a reaction to the "significant toll" that the FOIA has allegedly taken "on the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to perform their congressionally authorized functions." Letter from Rep. Robert McClory to Congressional Colleagues 1 (July 27, 1979). matters as a criminal investigation by the Postal Service, 08 whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute, 1 0 9 and the right of a FOIA requester to patent applications and related information."1 0 While some of the decisions are interesting and potentially significant, their primary importance is that they demonstrate the ongoing process of straightforward classification of statutes under the amended Exemption 3.111 IV.
INTRA-AGENCY MEMORANDUM EXEMPTION

A. Confidential Commericial Information.
Exemption 5 of the FOIA permits agencies to withhold "interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with an agency." 1 2 Several significant federal cases last year interpreted this exemption and its relationship to the federal discovery rules. 115. 12 C.F.R. § 271.5 (1979). 116. The Federal Open Market Committee regulates the money supply and federal funds rate (the rate at which banks will lend or borrow immediately available reserves on an overnight basis) by purchasing or selling securities in the open market. Selling securities decreases bank reserves and thereby diminishes investment activity; buying securities has the opposite effect. The committee meets monthly to formulate monetary policy for the upcoming period, and sets out its decisions in the directives. After the effective period of a directive has passed, the Federal Open Market Committee releases it for publication in the Federal Register. Merrill sued to compel earlier disclosure. See the discussion in 99 S. Ct. at 2803-05.
immediate disclosure, as ordered by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia "would seriously interfere with the conduct of national monetary policy. With two Justices dissenting," 8 the Supreme Court ruled that under Exemption 5, the Federal Open Market Committee could delay publishing the directives, if they "contain sensitive information not otherwise available, and if immediate release of these Directives would significantly harm the Government's monetary functions or commercial interests,""1 9 as the Federal Open Market Committee claimed.' 20 The Court held that the directives were clearly intra-agency memoranda: the Federal Open Market Committee satisfied the Administrative Procedure Act's definition of "agency,"' 2 and the directives were written instructions to the Federal Open Market Committee's Account Manager, who carries out the policies set forth therein.
On the more difficult and significant question of the applicability of a privilege that would make the document nondiscoverable, the Court determined that the records "would not be available by law to a party . . .in litigation with the agency."' 22 Although the directives were not subject to the attorney-client privilege, the attorney's work product privilege, or the executive privilege for predecisional deliberations within the agency' 23 -the only privileges the Court had previously recognized in Exemption 51 24 --4he majority nevertheless held 117. Id at 2807. The Federal Open Market Committee conceded that the directives were "statements of general policy ... formulated and adopted by the agency," that had to be "currently publish[ed] in the Federal Register" under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976). 99 S. Ct. at 2807. However, the Federal Open Market Committee argued that it was not subject to the current publication requirements because of the applicability of a section 552(b) exemption. The Court commented that there was no conflict between a finding that the directives were final opinions yet exempt under subsection (b)(5), because it was not relying on the privilege for predecisional communications. 99 S. Ct. at 2812-13 n. [Vol. 1980:139 that the exemption did apply to the directives. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, explained that Exemption 5 includes a privilege for confidential commercial information pertaining to government contracts. In support of this holding, he referred to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7), which states that a court may, "for good cause shown,. . . [issue a protective order] that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way."' 125 Although the Court recognized that the FOIA's legislative history provided less support for including this privilege in Exemption 5 than for incorporating the executive and attorney-client privileges, it nonetheless found a sufficient foundation in the House Report and House and Senate committee hearings. 126 For example, agencies testifying at hearings preceding the FOIA's enactment expressed concern about the disclosure of confidential commercial information. In addition, the House Report on the FOIA states that Exemption 5 is intended to exempt from disclosure "documents or information which it has received or generated before it completes the process of awarding a contract .... ,,127 Given the agency concerns and this statement from the House Report, the Court decided that it was appropriate to infer that Exemption 5 incorporates "a limited privilege for confidential commercial information pertaining to [government] contracts."' 128 The Court also concluded that the Domestic Policy Directives, which relate to the government's purchase and sale of securities, "are substantially similar to confidential commercial information generated in the process of awarding a contract."' 129 Therefore, upon a showing (to the district court) that immediate disclosure would have a serious detrimental effect,' 30 the directives would be exempt. 
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Justice Stevens' dissent, which Justice Stewart joined "insofar as it expresses views concerning the 'legal question' presented,"' 31 attacked the majority's reading of the fifth exemption. In a lengthy footnote, Justice Stevens explained why he was not persuaded by the majority's analysis of the legislative history:
[The Court states] that only those privileges that are recognized in the legislative history of FOIA should be incorporated in the exemption. To the extent, however, that every reference in the subcommittee hearings to the danger of disclosing some type of governmental information suffices under this test-virtually every agency appeared before Congress with a list of such "dangers"--the exemption would render the Act meaningless. On the other hand, if the Court's test is designed to limit Exemption 5 to those references in the legislative history that clearly bear on Congress' final understanding of the Act, I see no justification for the Court's recognition of a vague "commercial information" component of that exemption.' 32 A proper reading of the legislative history, according to the dissent, demonstrates that Congress decided not to incorporate a "commercial information" exemption into the FOIA. 133 The dissent also argued that the idea of a "temporary" exemption, as permitted by the majority, is not consistent with the FOIA provision that the disclosure requirement "does not apply" when one of the exemptions is pertinent. 134 Of course, the majority's reliance on Rule 131. 99 S. Ct. at 2814 n.* Justice Stevens supplemented his own legal analysis by expressing his view-and that of several economists-that disclosure would be beneficial to the market. Id at 2814-15 & n.l.
132. Id at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 133. The dissent stated: First, the passage in the House Report that the Court relies on... is rather clearly directed both at a different governmental activity (I e., procurement of goods or services by the government acting as commercial buyer) and at a different stage in the course of that activity (le., "before it completes its process") than is involved in this case. Here, the agency is engaged in a clearly governmental activity--the regulation of financial markets-and has already settled upon its final position and has acted upon it. Moreover, the absence in the Senate Report of even this thin reed to support the Court's analysis is significant in light of our recognition that that report, rather than the House Report, is the most accurate reflection of the congressional will with respect to FOIA. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 363-367. . . .Finally, the fact that Congress did include a "commercial information" exemption in the Act, albeit one that clearly does not apply in this case-Exemption 4--should persuasively counsel against our adopting a novel and strained interpretation of another exemption to encompass such information. This is particularly so in this case in view of the fact that the very agency involved here unsuccessfully requested that Congress amend the proposed Exemption 4 to provide protection for the policy directives involved in this case. Hearings on H.R. 5012, etc. before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 55, 228, 229 (1965) . Having failed to provide such protection in Exemption 4, which so clearly relates to commercial information, Congress will no doubt be surprised to find that the Court has read that protection into Exemption 5. 99 S. Ct. at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976) . See note 29 sulpra.
FO4 DEVELOPMENTS 26(c)(7), which empowers courts to order that records "be disclosed only in a designated way,"' 35 supports the allowance of a temporary delay in disclosure. Although the majority opinion is logical in a tech- 137. This is especially true since Congress was aware of the problem and chose not to resolve the issue in this statute. See note 133 supra. The dissent's position, however-at least if the majority is correct in concluding that the government could assert the confidential commercial information privilege in discovery disputes-leads to the odd result that material exempt from discovery must be disclosed under the FOIA. DUKELAWJOUR.AL [Vol. 1980:139 the FOIA, refused to produce the documents. Rejecting this position, the district court concluded that "the FOIA and its exclusionary provisions are irrelevant to a motion to compel discovery under the Federal Rules"; 140 le., the FOIA places no limits on the discovery process. This differs from the situation inACLU v. Brown,' 4 ' in which the court determined that in civil discovery it is proper to review a claim of exemption under the state secrets privilege by looking to the FOIA's national security exemption' 42 for guidance. CanalAulhor/y declined to exempt documents from discovery solely because they could have been withheld if requested under the FOIA; in4CLU v. Brown,1 43 the FOIA merely provided the standards by which to review a claim of privilege that the court recognized as applicable in the discovery context.'4 Even when a court looks to the FOIA for guidance in a discovery dispute, the Act can suggest only a tentative solution. All courts acknowledge that whereas a litigant's need for the requested information can overcome a claim of privilege in discovery, need is irrelevant in an FOIA action.1 45 A good example of this principle is the criminal case 144. In accord with both cases is McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1979). As in CanalAuthority, the court found reliance on FOIA exemptions to be misplaced. The court determined that the materials were discoverable unless the executive privilege applied; accordingly, it turned to Exemption 5 case law for guidance on this point. In fact, the records in McClel/and had been requested under the FOIA. The court chose, however, to ignore the form of the request and to treat it as one for discovery in the administrative proceeding between the parties. As long as the court treats the request as arising under the FOIA or under discovery procedure-without giving the requester benefits of both procedures-this "switch" seems unobjectionable on FOIA grounds.
Many courts have applied Exemption 5 cases by way of analogy in civil discovery disputes over an assertion of privilege. Justice Brennan, for example, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 193-94 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part), described the executive privilege by referring to the Court's Exemption 5 cases. However, since the fifth exemption does not include all discovery privileges (see notes 124 & 128 supra and accompanying text with regard to the Supreme Court's attempt to avoid duplicating privileges found in other exemptions by incorporating them in Exemption 5), it may be appropriate, as in ACLU v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979), to look to other FOIA exemptions as well. An interesting problem is presented when a litigant attempts to use the FOIA, rather than the discovery process, to get information helpful for his case. In Cooper v. Department of the Navy, Irving v. DiLapi, 46 in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision that union authorization cards should be disclosed to the defendants pursuant to their subpoena. 147 Acknowledging that the cards would be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, 48 the court nevertheless ordered production because the defendant's need for the material outweighed the government's (public's) interest in confidentiality. While these cases do not effect radical changes in the law, they do help clarify an area important under both the FOIA and the Federal Rules.
V. INVESTIGATORY RECORDS EXEMPTION
A. Law Enforcement Purposes.
Exemption 7 of the FOIA permits agencies to withhold "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,"' 49 if at least one of six other conditions is met.' 50 The initial question in adjudicating any Exemption 7 claim, therefore, is whether the records are both investigatory and compiled for law enforcement purposes. Records do 594 F.2d 484 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 266 (1979), survivors of a helicopter crash requested access to an agency's report about the accident. The court ordered disclosure, finding that the agency had waived any Exemption 5 privilege when it released the report more widely than necessary in carrying out the government's purpose of assembling the report. Of special concern to the court was that the opposing counsel in the case was given access to the report:
It is intolerable that such confidential documents should be furnished to one side of a lawsuit and not to the other.... [Wlhere, as here, a company representative primarily concerned with litigation is, pursuant to wearing his 'other hat'-a subsidiary responsibility for aircraft design and operational safety, permitted general access to guarded matter and a copy of it appears in defense counsers hands, a determination that its confidentiality has been waived is not clearly wrong. . . .[L]ike rank, privileges such as these carry corresponding responsibilities, and we concur in the district court's refusal to permit them to be trifled with as they were here. Id at 488. Insofar as the court actually based its conclusion on the waiver, it is clearly correct; insofar as the litigant's need figured in the decision, the court is clearly wrong.
146 Revenue Service documents containing unsolicited information about misconduct by a lawyer, "where the information subsequently led to the consideration of disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer,"' 53 fell within Exemption 7. The court found that the informants "obviously intended that the information provoke or contribute to an IRS investigation of [the attorney] and various other individuals, and the information was in fact incorporated into an investigation of appellee's fitness to practice before the IRS."' 154 The records were thus investigatory and compiled for law enforcement purposes.
The timing of the law enforcement investigation can be critical. In Therefore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had not collected the information for any law enforcement purpose, but rather as part of its general monitoring and surveillance of Lamont. Applying a test of whether the agency believed in good faith that the subject of its investigation had violated the law, the court denied the government's Exemption 7 claim, subject to the introduction of further proof of the investigation's law enforcement purpose. The character of the materials excluded under Exemption 7 at least suggests that "law enforcement purpose" is as much a description of the type of agency the exemption is aimed at as it is a condition on the use of the exemption by agencies having administrative as well as civil enforcement duties. We see strong policy reasons supporting this reading of "law enforcement purpose" which would, assuming other conditions are met, extend the exemption to all investigative files of a criminal law enforcement agency.' 68 The court reasoned that if it did not label the files "law enforcement records," even the presence of one of the six enumerated harms required to exempt such records from disclosure would not permit the agency to withhold them. Furthermore, the court noted that determining whether each investigation had a law enforcement purpose "would place an unmanageable burden upon district courts. Few cases would be as obvious as this at the affidavit stage." 169 In support of its position, the Irons court cited various statements in the legislative history, including several references to Exemption 7 records as "investigatory records of the FBI." 170 Reading the legislative history as showing that "investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are inherently records compiled for 'law enforcement purposes' within the meaning of Exemption 7,"171 the opinion noted that "further legislation and not the FOIA, should define and provide sanctions for unjustified surveillance activity." the law. 174 The FOIA, enacted as a mechanism to allow public oversight of government, 175 In Nemacolin Mines Corp. v. NLRAB, 17 9 the district court denied the NLRB's claim of exemption for witness statements given in the course of an unfair labor practice investigation that had been completed in all respects. The National Labor Relations Board argued that disclosure would interfere with future enforcement proceedings by diminishing the agency's ability to induce informants to make statements. According to the plaintiff-requester, on the other hand, statements are exempt only during proceedings in which they are potentially useful. Judge McCune adopted the requester's position, holding that Exemption 7(A) does not bar "post-enforcement disclosure of statements made to the NLRB while investigating an unfair labor practice charge." 180 The court distinguished Robbins Tire on the facts and demonstrated that the Supreme Court's rationale for holding the statements exempt in that case required a finding of no exemption in Nemacoln.
In Robbins Tire, the witness statements were sought before the hearing on the unfair labor practice charge as a means of supplementing-indeed, circumventing-the National Labor Relations Board's discovery procedures. The Supreme Court was concerned that prehearing disclosure would interfere with the particular proceeding," 8 " and the Court noted the same concern in the legislative history. But, as the Nemacolin court indicated, " [w] here the administrative agency has no intention to use the statements in later enforcement proceedings, there are no 'enforcement proceedings' which disclosure could disrupt."' 82 Therefore, the court found that Exemption 7(A) did not authorize the National Labor Relations Board to withhold the documents, regardless of the 180. Id at 523. 181. The concern is that witnesses will be intimidated, or that the company will construct defenses that cause the violations to go unremedied. 437 U.S. at 241. These concerns are present whenever there is an "imminent adjudicatory proceeding. 84 a Fifth Circuit panel held that contempt proceedings before a special master are enforcement proceedings to which the exemption applies. The court acknowledged that the proceedings were not identical, but saw the essential circumstances-the prosecutorial function and the statute being enforced' 85 -as the same. 1 86 Another court applied the Robbins Tire holding to a situation in which the witness' statement, located in a file on a withdrawn charge, was relevant to a second, pending proceeding. 1 87 Once the National Labor Relations Board demonstrated the affidavit's relevance to the pending proceeding, it was exempt under Exemption 7(A) without a "particularized showing of potential harm from disclosure." ' 
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183. The court also rejected the claim of exemption under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D), which allows agencies to withhold law enforcement records if disclosure would identify a confidential source. Two factors influenced this conclusion. First, every National Labor Relations Board declarant signs a statement that he has been assured confidentiality until and unless he is called to testify as a witness at the hearing.
Since the declarant could expect, at the time his statement was given, to be called as a witness by the NLRB, his justifiable expectation of protection at that time is the protection given to a witness. As a result, disclosure does not substantially compromise the justifiable expectations of the declarant. 467 F. Supp. at 525. Second, the National Labor Relations Board purports to grant confidentiality to all declarants by use of the statement referred to above. The court opined that its holding might differ if only reluctant sources were assured of confidentiality. "[Eixemption 7(D) requires the grant of confidentiality to be made on the basis of good faith discretion, not on the basis of arbitrary rule, as the grant was made in this case." Id But see Pacheco v. FBI, 470 F. Supp. 1091, 1100-01 (D.P.R. 1979). In Pacheco the court held that Exemption 7(D) exempted the records although the government's affidavit stated that some of the information concerned witnesses to crimes who might be called upon to testify publicly. The court apparently accepted the Bureau's argument that the informants had all received implied assurances of confidentiality. Nemacolin and Pacheco may be distinguishable, however, in that the FBI, as a criminal law enforcement agency, receives greater protection under Exemption 7(D however, a district court discussed the applicability of Exemption 8 to a request for records from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which, as the insurer, possessed the records of a closed bank.
The narrow question for decision in Gregory was whether the exemption permitted agencies to withhold records concerning closed banks. The court held that it did not, despite the court's agreement with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation that the statute does not differentiate between open and closed banks. "The FDIC is correct in asserting that these documents fall within the plain language of the statute. . . [But] when a literal reading leads to an unreasonable result, a court can look behind the plain meaning of the statute."' ' 93 According to the district judge, the exemption's plain meaning would seal the bank's records for all time, even if the bank had been closed for many years.
The Gregory court determined that exempting records of closed banks would not further either of the provision's two purposes. The exemption would not help maintain the bank's financial integrity, for "[o]nce a bank has been closed, its financial soundness cannot be undermined."1 94 Therefore, a literal reading of the statute would be irrelevant in effectuating its "central purpose."' 9 5 Moreover, permitting the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to withhold the records would not further the statute's second goal of safeguarding the bank-agency relationship. The opinion cautioned against being so concerned with good relations that the purpose of regulation is forgotten, and noted that good relations are certainly immaterial in the context of a closed 
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